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In reply to the discussion: Risk limiting audit results from PRIMARY in Pennsylvania - one batch showed half of the votes had not been counted [View all]mchill
(1,152 posts)Philip Stark. a statistics professor at UC Berkeley developed the risk-limiting audit procedure in GA. I was actually quoting him from a Zoom call I attended two months ago… “Garbage in, garbage out” in the application of this auditing procedure in Georgia.
The problem is how the actual votes that are sampled are generated. Here’s what he (and others) say about using Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) to create votes:
Philip B. Stark (University of California, Berkeley) weigh in against the use of Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs). Their objections to BMDs include
1. BMDs are computers so subject to hacking and misprogramming.
2. BMDs may not accurately record the vote as the voter has expressed it.
3. BMD output cannot be easily checked by the voter even if the voter is motivated to spend the time checking it.
4. A risk-limiting audit cannot check whether errors in how BMDs record expressed votes altered election outcomes.
To reduce the risk that computers undetectably alter election results by printing erroneous votes on the official paper audit trail, the use of BMDs should be limited to voters who require assistive technology to vote independently.
Sorry, lost the citation for this particular summary but can be found within here:
https://coalitionforgoodgovernance.org/election-research-resources/
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