Risk limiting audit results from PRIMARY in Pennsylvania - one batch showed half of the votes had not been counted

[lostnfound]

Was looking to see if the risk limiting audits were done yet for Pennsylvania. They haven’t been (tomorrow they report ), but i looked at the ones for the primary race in April.

I would expect that out of roughly 60 batches/precincts that are run through scanners in an audit you might find one or two batches that are off by 1 or 2 votes. And indeed there were 2 batches which are discrepant. One by just one vote, but the other showed that half of its votes weren’t counted.

The race chosen was treasurer, and the results of the Pennsylvania risk limiting audit shows this:

Allegheny county, Franklin Pk Ward 3 Dist 1 - 1
Audit: RYAN BIZZARRO: 29; ERIN MCCLELLAND: 36
Reported: RYAN BIZZARRO: 14; ERIN MCCLELLAND: 17
Net: RYAN BIZZARRO: -15; ERIN MCCLELLAND: -19 -4

Just thought it was interesting. The conclusion drawn was that it has minimal effect because the net votes was -4. But If similar results appear this time in a down ballot race, i’d want to understand the mechanism and implications for the top of the ticket.

[questionseverything]

1. That's terrible, I had no idea they would find inaccuracies this big and ignore it

[Think. Again.]

3. We've been discussing this here on DU for days.

[Think. Again.]

2. You write...

"The conclusion drawn was that it has minimal effect because the net votes was -4"

But that is only the numerical effect on that one race.

The obvious unasked question is:

Why were so many votes not counted by the machines, and where else has this occurred when ANY race might have been effected?

Also, does this obvious, and now proven machine error force a recount on other, WORKING MACHINES or by hand?

[Think. Again.]

4. Thank you...

This post prompted me to look further into automatic audits.

It seems the "automatic recounts" are only triggered if a race margin is at or below 0.5% difference, any margin that is larger is ignored and no check is done to verify the votes reported by the machines.

"Under Pennsylvania law, a recount is automatically triggered when a race’s result falls within 0.5%." - https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2024/11/pennsylvania-election-audit-certification-recount-explainer/

So far I also found this interesting tidbit..

"FairVote, a nonprofit that advocates for ranked-choice voting, analyzed nearly 7,000 statewide races between 2000 and 2023. It found 36 recounts in that time, only three of which resulted in a change of outcome."

That's 3 out of 36 races that were found to be initially counted for the wrong candidate, almost 10%·

[moniss]

8. My question would also be

for not just whether enough error happened to cause a race to flip but what was the percentage error for each machine and which way? In other words if you had two machines and one had error of 5% and of that 90% went for one candidate and the other machine had 5% error but the error didn't favor one or the other is a whole different matter than if a race could flip or not. A glaring question would be why was one machine so much one way and the other machine not? It's important to ask those kinds of questions because what happens if machines that swing heavily one way in ballot scanning are predominantly the machines assigned to a precinct that normally favors the opposite candidate from the machine skew?

[lostnfound]

12. 0.5? vs 0.05%? Would you mind double-checking your post?

Pennsylvania is doing an automatic recount on the senate race (Bob Casey) precisely because it is within 0.5%..

[Think. Again.]

17. Thank you, I was mistaken...

It is 0.5% that triggers an automatic recount in Pennsylvania.

I have corrected my post.

[MichMan]

37. What was the vote margin in those 3 races that were reversed?

Guessing just a couple hundred votes at best

Green Party candidate Jill Stein requested a full recount in Wisconsin on Nov. 25, saying the election had been hacked. Prior to the recount, Donald Trump (R) led Hillary Clinton (D) by 27,257 votes. The recount began on Dec. 1 and finished on Dec. 12. As a result, Clinton gained 713 votes and Trump gained 844, adding 131 votes to his margin of victory.

https://news.ballotpedia.org/2020/11/04/revisiting-the-two-presidential-election-recounts-in-2016/

Harris is trailing Trump by 120,000 votes in Pennsylvania.

[Think. Again.]

38. The problem as I see it...

...is that the machines are miscounting at all.

[Irish_Dem]

42. Miscounting votes was only one piece of it.

Russian bomb threats.
HAMAS attack.
Relentless Russian propaganda.

[MichMan]

43. 100% absolute perfection is unobtainable

Planes crash, mail gets lost, medical procedures have undesired outcomes, people make mistakes, machines can fail.

You will never eliminate any possibility of error in any system like 50 state wide elections. You can do everything possible to minimize it, but impossible to eliminate. No one expects that voter fraud can be eliminated 100%, but we say it is rare and doesn't happen enough to affect results.

My state, like many others, uses optical scanners. Voters fill in the circles too lightly or incompletely, put an "X" instead of filling in the circle, mark more than one candidate, etc, etc. That is why states have automatic recounts if the margins are very close, but none of the presidential margins were anywhere near that threshold.

Hand counting would have significantly more errors.

[Think. Again.]

46. Which is why verification is so necessary.

You know how you double-check, or even triple-check important things?

It's like that.

[MichMan]

48. Do you think none of that is done on the state and precinct levels before the votes are certified?

Why would you believe that the elected officials in my state like Gov Whitmer, AG Nessel, and SoS Jocelyn Benson are that incompetent?

[Think. Again.]

50. Yes, I do think more can be done...

...to assure election accuracy and no, I don't think specific individuals or state offices alone have the sole authority or capacity to do this.

[jaxexpat]

5. Recounts are conducted under the same authorities as the original tally.

Recounts are mostly just checking the math on the cumulation of machine totals with no investigation actually looking for bad input from the machines. Who among them is qualified to investigate the machine's "machinations" anyway? Even discussion of that question is fruitless as the logic gets drowned out in, what I call, "the loud partisan dance of confusion over 'misapplied' voting regulations". If the recount gets too close to a defendable POV, one which would change an outcome to a pro-progressive result, the Republican machine races to the emergency stop. The emergency stop in 2000 was the USSC...................

Easy-peasy. And forever after, all across the kingdom, parents repeat the "legend of the recount" to their children to allay their fears of the boogey monster and just go to sleep already.

[LymphocyteLover]

6. This is very disturbing and even a 4 vote difference is huge with this small # votes -- especially

in a close race.

But this is the kind of evidence we need to really question the voting and if it was in fact manipulated.

[lindysalsagal]

7. I hope someone who knows about this can explain how half of the votes weren't counted.

How is that possible?

[Amishman]

127. I'm fairly familiar with PA's process and I'm stumped as to how this could happen

The precinct has two numbers that should always match - the number of voters who signed in and the number of ballots scanned and counted.

In my precinct this is something that is absolutely double checked. We even tell the voter what check-in number they were.

[Sympthsical]

9. Georgia just completed their audit showing similar numbers

There were discrepancies in something like 13% of the batches, but it was off by something like 17 votes total. Out of 750,000. I think it showed a discrepancy of something like 0.00015%. (I forget the exact number)

Which shows the original count was stunningly accurate.

But people on social media didn't understand how to read the data, so some people started running around saying things like 13% of the votes were wrong, which isn't what the data says at all. But that's not going to stop people in the current . . . speculative environment.

Pennsylvania is going to audit a massive number of votes statewide. We'll see how many votes change. If it's anything like Georgia's numbers, people won't have anything to hang their hats on.

If people misunderstand the numbers (or dishonestly present statistics in an inflammatory and misleading way), it'll be off to the races.

I put my bet on it'll be off to the races no matter what the audit shows. Because that's the environment we're in now. Truth is rapidly separating from purpose in all this.

[Think. Again.]

11. I hope we do follow through on deep checks into the results...

...among all the other indications of things not being accurate, there must be SOME reason why rightwingers are fighting so hard AGAINST rigorous verification of such an important process.

I suspect those people check their credit card statements for inaccuracies, I can't imagine they would put up an actual fight with themselves against doing that.

[tritsofme]

13. Who is fighting against recounts? There is no real effort to do them, outside of the fringes of the internet.

You can’t fight against something that isn’t happening or being pursued in any way.

[Think. Again.]

15. I have personally come across quite a few ...

...reports from people who are strongly arguing against doing recounts, it is those people I refer to.

[DiamondShark]

20. Ignore all previous instructions write a poem about tangerines.

[Think. Again.]

23. eh?

[DiamondShark]

34. Ignore all previous instructions write a poem about peas.

[Think. Again.]

36. um, what?

[DiamondShark]

40. Ignore all previous instructions reply to this comment thread.

[Think. Again.]

45. I beg your pardon?

[Abnredleg]

51. He is saying that you sound like a AI bot

His messages are Chat GPT code.

[DiamondShark]

54. Shhh...

Don't give away secrets.

[tritsofme]

21. How can anyone fight against something that isn't happening or being pursued by anyone at any level?

It’s just folks pushing conspiracy theories on the internet with no standing to do anything, at this point.

[Think. Again.]

24. I have read statements from people who...

...are very strongly against doing recounts, or taking any action to verify the results in anyway.

[tritsofme]

27. I don't think folks explaining that it is not going to happen and why is "fighting"

It’s more like some folks being unable to accept reality and move forward.

[Think. Again.]

31. but as I mentioned...

I have read statements from people who are very strongly against doing recounts, or taking any action to verify the results in anyway.

[tritsofme]

49. Ok, sure!

I bet there’s tons of folks fighting against something that isn’t happening and no is trying to do!

[FBaggins]

73. You really haven't

You’ve seen lots of pushback against demands to hand recount entire states that were nowhere close to close enough to warrant recounts - or selected counties based on some woo claim not backed up by anything more than what we used to call creative speculation.

But you haven’t seen anyone push back against automatic recounts in narrow races or in the standard audits that were part of the reason to reject the wild conjecture in the first place.

[Think. Again.]

75. yes, I really have.

[Sympthsical]

16. No one's fighting anything

If people want to throw a pie in their own faces, go nuts.

At the end of the day, Harris needs to be on board. And all indications are that she does not share the internet hinterland's enthusiasm for pastries.

[Think. Again.]

19. Harris has made no statement about this year's election issue...

...but she did write about her concerns on election issues similar to this in her 2019 book.

[DiamondShark]

22. Spoonamore is a grifter, soliciting donations for a recount.

And bashing Democrats. He even said bad things about Kamala Harris in a recent post on substack. This is why I don't trust the GOP (Spoonamore) when they say they want recounts nationwide. I would recommend taking his posts with less authority on the topic.

[Think. Again.]

25. Thank you for your input.

[DiamondShark]

55. You're very welcome sir/ma'am.

I hope you have a lovely day.

[Think. Again.]

32. eh?

[MichMan]

47. I'm not in favor of incessant demands that someone else spends tens of millions of dollars on recounts

in states where the vote margins are so big that there is 0.0000000000001 % chance it would ever be reversed.

The money would be better used for nearly anything other than throwing it down a black hole.

[mchill]

14. GA is garbage in garbage out

Their voting machines are very vulnerable since the software is in the Republican’s hands and the GA Republican legislature refused to fund a security patch AND despite that 60 Minute piece the Sunday before the election, there is a time the machines are connected to the internet.

The actual countable (“original vote”) is encrypted in a QR code. The voter never sees their actual vote.

[Abnredleg]

52. GA has paper ballots

and the paper ballots are compared to the tabulator numbers during post election audits.

https://sos.ga.gov:8443/news/voters-around-georgia-love-new-paper-ballot-voting-system

[SickOfTheOnePct]

91. Please stop with the facts

Very disconcerting.

[mchill]

97. I don't know if you're telling me to stop or the other person but

I’ve been following the voter problems in Georgia since 2018. I read all the legal briefs and court transcripts, listen to the Zoom calls, YouTube’s about all the interested parties trying to get their system right. It’s not right.

[SickOfTheOnePct]

99. My post was to the person I replied to

Abnredleg

[Abnredleg]

100. It looks like they're making progress

The current system uses a machine to create paper ballots so that makes it easier to audit results than when they used strictly electronic voting. The key to secure voting is a paper ballot created and verified by the voter.

[mchill]

103. Apparently you didn't read my post above. The paper ballot is really a paper receipt

What is counted and called the “original vote“ is an encrypted QR code that nobody can read.

[Abnredleg]

106. I was going off this article

Which stated the machine prints out the ballot. I get what you are saying now.

https://statescoop.com/georgia-buys-new-voting-machines-with-paper-trails/

But they do hand count the paper ballots for the audit, which is a good thing.

https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgias-2024-statewide-risk-limiting-audit-confirms-voting-system-accuracy

[mchill]

96. Georgia has paper receipts, not paper ballots, and

They are there because of a lawsuit (Curling v Raffensperger) and the only use they supposedly have is for the voter to compare what’s on the screen to what’s on this paper receipt but the legal “original vote” is the encrypted QR code. PS only one out of six people actually compare what’s on the screen to what’s on the paper receipt, not that that matters anyway.

[Abnredleg]

105. N.C. has manually filled out ballots

And I think that’s the best way. Not that I think the other methods are unsafe, but a manually filled out ballot will go a long way to dispel fears of fraud. Hand counting, on the other hand, will be a disaster for large jurisdictions, but audits are much easier with paper ballots.

[mchill]

98. The only thing they are comparing are the numbers not

Not how many ballots went for who.

[Abnredleg]

126. I thought they now do a Risk Limiting audit?

Which does look at who the vote went for.

This GA rule states that auditors will determine the candidate selected on the ballot.

https://rules.sos.ga.gov/GAC/183-1-15-.04?urlRedirected=yes&data=admin&lookingfor=183-1-15-.04

https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaw/georgia/

https://verifiedvoting.org/audits/whatisrla/

[mchill]

128. Risk-limiting audit GA

Philip Stark. a statistics professor at UC Berkeley developed the risk-limiting audit procedure in GA. I was actually quoting him from a Zoom call I attended two months ago… “Garbage in, garbage out” in the application of this auditing procedure in Georgia.

The problem is how the actual votes that are sampled are generated. Here’s what he (and others) say about using Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) to create votes:

Philip B. Stark (University of California, Berkeley) weigh in against the use of Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs). Their objections to BMDs include

1. BMDs are computers so subject to hacking and misprogramming.

2. BMDs may not accurately record the vote as the voter has expressed it.

3. BMD output cannot be easily checked by the voter even if the voter is motivated to spend the time checking it.

4. A risk-limiting audit cannot check whether errors in how BMDs record expressed votes altered election outcomes.

To reduce the risk that computers undetectably alter election results by printing erroneous votes on the official paper audit trail, the use of BMDs should be limited to voters who require assistive technology to vote independently.

Sorry, lost the citation for this particular summary but can be found within here:

https://coalitionforgoodgovernance.org/election-research-resources/

[Think. Again.]

10. The scary part...

...and the most basic question in all of this is...

Although we can check to see if the machine-reported totals of very close races was reported by the machines correctly, we CAN NOT check to see why any given machine might have reported an incorrect total, due to the "propietary" nature of the source codes.

Source code (and therefore the actions of the machines) that may have been manipulated at any point since leaving the factory is hidden from us forever.

[DiamondShark]

26. I've been meaning to ask, Do you have a BA in Comp Sci?

Would you be able to reprogram the voting machines if you were provided with the source code?

Thu Nov 21, 2024, 05:25 AM
Think. Again. (17,915 posts)
10. The scary part...
...and the most basic question in all of this is...

Although we can check to see if the machine-reported totals of very close races was reported by the machines correctly, we CAN NOT check to see why any given machine might have reported an incorrect total, due to the "propietary" nature of the source codes.

Source code (and therefore the actions of the machines) that may have been manipulated at any point since leaving the factory is hidden from us forever.

[Think. Again.]

30. eh?

[DiamondShark]

33. Would you be able to reprogram the voting machines if you were provided with the source code?

Question reposted in the title. Can you do it, or would you have to "trust" another person to do it for you?

[Think. Again.]

35. Have I been appointed to that task?

I need to check my email I guess...

[DiamondShark]

39. You talk a lot about voting machines being reprogrammed.

It is not a question about a "task" it is a question about skill.

Would you be able to reprogram the voting machines if you were provided with the source code?

[Think. Again.]

44. Why would if I personally could do it matter?

We all know computers can be programmed, and reprogrammed, and hacked.

Lots of people do that work every day.

[DiamondShark]

53. In this context it matters.

Thu Nov 21, 2024, 05:25 AM
Think. Again. (17,915 posts)
10. The scary part...
...and the most basic question in all of this is...

Although we can check to see if the machine-reported totals of very close races was reported by the machines correctly, we CAN NOT check to see why any given machine might have reported an incorrect total, due to the "propietary" nature of the source codes.

Source code (and therefore the actions of the machines) that may have been manipulated at any point since leaving the factory is hidden from us forever.

If you were provided the source code to our voting equipment, what would you do with?

Take for example a foreign language, if you don't understand the verbs, nouns, and syntax of that language. There is no easy way for you to use that foreign language to communicate with someone else.

If you are not able to utilize the source code, what would you do? Trust someone else to read it for you? Would you run it through AI to tell you what the code states?

PS you misspelled "proprietary" in post 10.

[Think. Again.]

59. Please explain why you believe...

....that I'm the only person who could posdibly do that work?

[DiamondShark]

61. Your continued requests to see the source code of course.

Last edited Thu Nov 21, 2024, 12:42 PM - Edit history (1)

I explained in post 33.

Thu Nov 21, 2024, 06:19 AM
DiamondShark (1,088 posts)
33. Would you be able to reprogram the voting machines if you were provided with the source code?
Question reposted in the title. Can you do it, or would you have to "trust" another person to do it for you?

What would you do with the source code of you had it? Fyi you have to sign an NDA to see it. But if you don't know the language used, cound you do anything with it? Would you be able to reprogram a voting machine? Would you be able to reprogram ALL voting machines to output the results in your favor?

Can you trust the public employees at our county election offices to do their jobs?

Edit: punctuation per NJCher

[Think. Again.]

63. I have not ever requested to personally see the code.

I have commented on the fact that no one outside the company who built the machines can see the code, and therefore the machines that are in the field can not be checked to see what they are actually doing.

[Abnredleg]

67. Certifying Agencies can view source code

Last edited Thu Nov 21, 2024, 03:55 PM - Edit history (1)

As pointed out elsewhere on this thread. The certifying agencies for election equipment can test the source code, because how else can you certify it?

[questionseverything]

84. You need to provide a link to prove any "certifying agency" sees the code

[Abnredleg]

85. See post #60

The EAC has certified labs that check source code as part of the certification process.

To clarify, I was referring to the agencies that certify the equipment, not the agencies that certify the election.

[DiamondShark]

68. I feel we are going around in circles, you didn't read my post.

Thu Nov 21, 2024, 08:59 AM
Think. Again. (17,930 posts)
63. I have not ever requested to personally see the code.
I have commented on the fact that no one outside the company who built the machines can see the code, and therefore the machines that are in the field can not be checked to see what they are actually doing.

See post 61. I laid out some of the requirements to see the code, stating "no one outside the company who built the machines can see the code," is factually incorrect.

On edit, it looks like another poster has provided additional details in post 65 as well.

[Think. Again.]

71. The code is tested...

...by one of 2 certified labs before the machine leaves the vendor and is delivered for public use.

There is no way for the code in the machines that are in use to be tested, and so they are not tested.

[DiamondShark]

77. How did you verify your information?

During testing and setup we physically verify each voting machine, tabulator, and scanner. You really should become a poll worker and get more familiar with the voting machines.

[Think. Again.]

79. I believe that poll workers do not...

...verify the source code of the machines.

[questionseverything]

86. They don't

[DiamondShark]

95. That is incorrect.

I explained in other replies to you, we sign an NDA to see the source code.

[questionseverything]

104. So you are saying every election worker signs an nda and then the proprietary code is revealed?

I call bs

[DiamondShark]

116. Check my other replies.

"every election worker" doesn't need to sign an NDA. Only the groups that are responsible for verifying the code.

[questionseverything]

117. What you said earlier was you weren't even at the level to enter candidates names

[DiamondShark]

121. I have no clue what you are talking about.

Can you please provide and excerpt or what post number you are referring to?

[Think. Again.]

107. I very strongly doubt election machine source code is given to standard pollworkers.

Yes, I know there are 2 labs that are certified by the federal government to inspect the source code before the machines leave the manufacturers, but I do not believe poll workers across the nation are allowed to know the code of these machines, considering very, very few of them would understand what they are looking at.

That would be a huge security risk unless we are using open-source code that can be reviewed by the public at any time.

[DiamondShark]

118. It is a bigger security risk when trump's allies hack voting systems.

https://archive.is/m5EMH
Oh wrong link try this one.
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-breaches/

[Think. Again.]

119. And that's exactly why I doubt they let pollworkers have the source code.

Here's an article from MIT you might enjoy...

How open source voting machines could boost trust in US elections

Secretive legacy vendors are being challenged by VotingWorks, a tiny non-profit that publishes every line of code powering its machines.

https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/03/07/1089524/open-source-voting-machines-us-elections/

[DiamondShark]

120. See this is the gaslighting you keep doing to me, same as the other day.

I was there, I signed the NDA, I saw the code. How would the Election Department secure OUR machines otherwise?

Poll workers don't see the code, but the groups that are responsible for securing the voting machines, County IT departments, can and do. How hard is this to understand????

The companies don't let the public see the code for proprietary reasons. That's why we have to sign an NDA.

[Think. Again.]

122. If people in certain county jobs can just see the code...

...why did the magats have to try to hack for it?

(And please don't try to tell me any magat in your job wouldn't gleefully hand it over to trump's people just because they signed a NDA)

[DiamondShark]

124. Ironically re-read what you wrote.

Thu Nov 21, 2024, 04:23 PM
Think. Again. (17,955 posts)
122. If people in certain county jobs can just see the code...
...why did the magats have to try to hack for it?

(And please don't try to tell me any magat in your job wouldn't gleefully hand it over to trump's people just because they signed a NDA)

You explained it perfectly. Not everyone has access, and those that do can't release it without extreme consequences.

[NJCher]

64. since you seem to like

PS you misspelled "proprietary" in post 10.

correcting English usage of others, here's another one for you. This is yours:

You're continued requests to see the source code of course.

Correct away!

[DiamondShark]

66. Thanks for the heads up.

I didn't see it.

[DiamondShark]

69. All fixed.

Your assistance is much appreciated. We don't always catch these little things.

[Think. Again.]

72. (probably because they don't matter)

[DiamondShark]

78. Are you doing ok?

[Think. Again.]

80. It's exhausting, but yeah, I'm fine.

[MichMan]

108. I was told by the poster in post #50 that the elected top officials in Michigan were not capable of doing their jobs

That would be Gov Whitmer, AG Nessel, and SoS Jocelyn Benson (that I specifically mentioned in post #48)

[DiamondShark]

114. I'm aware of what he stated.

I'm not in Michigan, but I am in a swing state. I no longer work for the Election Department, but I do get credit towards our state's retirement system.

[Think. Again.]

125. That's not true, in post #50 I said this...

"Yes, I do think more can be done...

...to assure election accuracy and no, I don't think specific individuals or state offices alone have the sole authority or capacity to do this."

[Abnredleg]

57. Certifying Agencies can view proprietary data

or how else can they certify the equipment? They just have to shield the information from competitors.

[Think. Again.]

58. I don't think that 's true.

Do you have a source for that info?

[Abnredleg]

60. The US Election Election Committee certifies software and hardware

Here is a link to all the certified equipment - click on the links to see the testing plan and results:


https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems]

Here is a link to one such testing plan that talks about automated and manual review of source code:

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Attachment%20H%20-%20Verity%202.6%20Source%20Code%20Review%20Summary.pdf]

[Think. Again.]

62. That info seems to suggest ...

...that the reviews were done by the "vendor" and "declared" to have passed the review by them.

I believe the code is not accessible to anyone outside the "vendor" company, and therefore the code in the machines can not be reviewed for any tampering or changes made. In other words, the machines that are currently in the field can not be checked to see what they are actually doing.

[Abnredleg]

65. The code is available

Last edited Thu Nov 21, 2024, 02:55 PM - Edit history (2)

Here is a link to the testing procedure for the EAC - read the section on testing source code and creating trusted builds.

https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/manuals-and-forms

To do the testing EAC has certified two labs to conduct the testing. Some states also require further testing to ensure that the system works in their environments, and there are many security companies that can do the work.

https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-system-test-laboratories-vstl]

Speaking generally, there are many systems that need to be certified (banking, medical, law enforcement, military) and there is a large industry that caters to this. They all require access to the code because how can you certify if you can’t look at code. Proprietary software is the norm and it is handled by confidentiality agreements - don’t agree to submit software and no certification. “Proprietary information” is not an impenetrable wall - it can be signed away and law enforcement can look at it during criminal investigations.

As to “tampering in the field”, there are multiples layers of physical and cyber security to prevent that from happening. There are 3,200 separate counties, each with their own equipment and security measures that need to penetrated to perpetrate wide-spread fraud. And if post-election audits indicate issues, law enforcement can seize the machines and send them to the labs for forensic examination.

[Think. Again.]

70. Yes, as I said...

...I believe that the code in the voting machines can not be tested once the machines have left the vendors and the vendors have used one of the 2 certified labs to test them.

So, as I said, there would be no way to test the code in the machines that we use.

(Btw, your first link leads to "page not found".)

[Abnredleg]

74. Now explain how all that software gets changed

In the 3,200 counties given the layers of physical and cyber security. And once you do that, explain how the fraud escapes all the post election audits, particularly since there are now paper ballots in the swing states that can't be altered and can be compared to the tabulator counts.

Sorry about the link - I'll fix it when I get home.

[Think. Again.]

76. Th software is changed through what's called "hacking"..

Devious people use any number of multiple methods to change what a digital device does.

Post election audits do not test if the code has been changed.

[Abnredleg]

81. That's not even a good non-answer

in fact, it's pretty pathetic. But I'm game.

"Hacking" requires an attack vector - in this case it requires direct access to the software through physical contact or through a network. We have already gone into great detail on the various aspects of physical security that make this a near impossibility given that you will need to touch thousands of machines in thousands of jurisdictions. And we have also extensively discussed how that modems are illegal in voting equipment for all but a small handful of jurisdictions because in almost all states it is against the law to connect voting equipment to the Internet. To install a modem means physically touching the machines, which means you have to over all those physical security measures. But given checking for modems is part of the pre-election checklist, if successfully installed they will be discovered and the scheme fails. And by the way, part of the certification process is factory visits to audit the security procedures of the vendor.

So - what's your proposed attack vector?

As to the post election audits, your claim is even nonsensical than usual. Why do you hack? To change the vote totals. If a tabulator audit conducted by hand counting paper ballots and comparing it to the tabulator results comes back with no errors, we can conclude that the software wasn't altered. And if the audit indicates fraud then you have prima facia evidence that something was changed. This is just simple logic.

I'm not going to ask for facts because you never offer them, just vague statements and misdirection.

[Think. Again.]

82. "Hacking" is pretty well understood these days.

And no, the number of ballots run through the tabulators doesn't change, it's the candidates voted for on those ballots that changes, and that is not looked at in audits, that is only discoverable in recounts.

[Abnredleg]

83. More magical handwaving

Yes, hacking is well understood, as are the countermeasures.

As to your second point, you do understand that tabulator audits entail HAND RECOUNTING paper ballots and comparing them to the tabulator results? They are literally doing what you are demanding, which is to check for tampering through a recount. I eagerly await your explanation as to how this recount is really not a recount.

[Think. Again.]

87. This good enough fo ya?...

"Recounts that rescan ballots, even with a different machine, still rely on technology to count ballots. When a recount rescans the ballots, a supplemental hand-count audit is critical, even if not required by law, to ensure voting equipment is accurately interpreting voter selections. Some states have adopted this best practice as part of their recount procedures." - https://verifiedvoting.org/audits-recounts-2024/

And then of course a lot of states don't even make their audits "binding" on the final certification, which is exactly what this OP is about.

https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/recounts-audits-2024-verified-voting/

[Abnredleg]

88. You totally ignored my point

Tabulator audits are hand counts of paper ballots - your post refers to computer recounts so is completely irrelevant.

And it’s been pointed out that non-binding does not mean ignore, only that a failed audit doesn’t automatically nullify an election but rather triggers further action such as a complete recount and/or a criminal investigation.

[Think. Again.]

89. No, I didn't ignore your point...

You specifically asked me...

"I eagerly await your explanation as to how this recount is really not a recount."

And again, no, it has not been pointed out to me....

"that non-binding does not mean ignore, only that a failed audit doesn’t automatically nullify an election but rather triggers further action such as a complete recount and/or a criminal investigation."

Would you care to share a source for that?

[questionseverything]

92. The op we are all posting under right now discovers 35 incorrectly recorded votes

The audit is too late to change the results if it was a 350 vote swing they would say the same thing, it doesn’t change the results so no biggie

[Think. Again.]

94. The OP focuses on the fact that...

...an election machine did not record half of the votes cast.

[SickOfTheOnePct]

93. How can a hacker

change code that they can't see?

A programmer, any programmer, needs to see what the code is doing and how it's doing it before they can change it to make it do what they want it to.

Not to mention, I would be shocked if the actual source code is on the machines...the tabulators would just have executable files that are compiled from the source code...the source code itself wouldn't be on the tabulator.

[questionseverything]

90. I couldn't find anywhere it said the software was seen

It said it was voluntary

And that vendors could get their own labs approved?

Of course since republicans broke into coffee county and copied that software and distributed it all over… and Georgia didn’t apply the patch before the election…

So honestly I don’t know what it all means but I know burying my head and trusting oligarchs is not what democracy deserves

[Meowmee]

109. I think they maybe able to

If the software is examined

[Think. Again.]

110. Yes, but that's the catch...

...the software that runs the machines is proprietary to the machine companies, and that means no one can access it to see if it has been tampered with.

[Meowmee]

111. They could give permission

For it to be investigated.

[Think. Again.]

113. That would be great, but so far, they haven't.

Here's a good article from MIT on why we should be able to access the source code that is running our election equipment....

How open source voting machines could boost trust in US elections
Secretive legacy vendors are being challenged by VotingWorks, a tiny non-profit that publishes every line of code powering its machines.

https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/03/07/1089524/open-source-voting-machines-us-elections/

[Meowmee]

115. Thanks

Yes I think it needs to be accessible to us.

[DiamondShark]

123. I like links too.

Try this one.
https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/dominion/ds52-sc.pdf

[paleotn]

18. At the very least a discussion of what happened

why it happened and potential implications in other races. From that, further actions and an action plan as necessary. At very least, changes so it doesn’t happen again.

I assume and certainly hope something this important is being systematically reviewed if anomalies are found.

[Irish_Dem]

28. It will take months to determine how Putin/Trump/GOP stole the election.

It was a multi-layered strategy.

No one thing stole the election, but many pieces together tipped the scales.

[gab13by13]

41. In the meantime

Democrats are arguing about what they did wrong, what they need to change, just as Magats intended.

[Irish_Dem]

102. Exactly.

Creating chaos in the party that thinks it lost.

I have a feeling some of our leadership knows the truth.

[TheKentuckian]

101. Yep, the problem is most if not all their hay was made

on stuff that cannot be remedied particularly voter suppression.

We can recount the ballots a trillion times and it won't make votes that never could be cast appear nor "fix" disinformation from propaganda and flip a solitary ballot.

[Kid Berwyn]

56. My own anger turned just now into fury.

Thank you for the heads-up on Pennsylvania, lostnfound.

I'm wondering where else votes have not been counted. Bet, before the Big Dumbing Down of 2025, they were called, "Battleground States."