excop: Which means that military weapons are still appropriate {for militias}. The Constitution hasn't changed {since 1791}.
The constitution hasn't changed (much), but the law has. There is no longer any 'well regulated citizens militia' as envisioned by madison & ff. The militia act of 1792 was superseded by the militia act of ~1903 (charles dick act), which created the national gds & the UNorganized militia, the former a select militia, the latter failing the 2ndA litmus test in that it is UNORGANIZED, not well regulated.
jimmy: 1871: The word "arms" in the connection we find it in the Constitution.., refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the word is used in its military sense.
excop: Exactly, which means that "the people" have the right to keep and bear "arms" which would mean weapons that would be useful in a military sense.
Hahaha, as justice breyer might've said, strained & fractured reasoning. Only when adjunct to a well regulated citizens militia, which today is non existent. If there were an all encompassing citizens militia such as swiss have, then yeah, american militiamen could keep an assault rifle at home.
excop: Except it {miller} is not a militia based right. The founders used "the people" as a term of art. Everywhere that it is used, it has been interpreted as an individual right. "
T)he 'normal rule of statutory construction that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."'" Sullivan v. Stroop (1990). It violates the rules of statutory construction to interpret the Second Amendment in the way that you desire.
Sullivan v Stroop in 1990 cannot be extended backwards to constitutional periods & applied absolutely. Also a later ruling:
"While it is "the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning," Sullivan-Stroop, (1990) that "presumption is defeasible.. the presumption conflicts with other normal rules of construction." Bray v. Alexandria WHC (1993). Hence, the second occurrence of the term "state" in subsection 404(b) may have a narrower meaning than it bears in its first occurrence.
So your sullivan-stroop gambit is an expedient, it cannot be absolute & it's validity is contested in itself.
In 2ndA the words militia & people were used interchangeably & synonymously, as evidenced by sc justice joseph story in 1800s. Note how story is clearly referring to the militia when he uses the underlined word 'people':
SC Justice Joseph Story, early 1800's: .. though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline,and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt, and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our National Bill of Rights."
Clearly the organization story refers to is a well regulated militia, which was by law defined as white males ~17-45, which excluded women, slaves, children & retired (50 was the expected life expectancy in 1790). The 'people' were white males 17-45.
And read story's last sentence. He is concerned that indifference to militia service would gradually undermine ALL the protection of the 2ndA, which would make no sense whatsoever if story was speaking of an individual rkba disconnected from militia service.
And, were 2ndA an individual right disconnected from militia service, story would not be worried about keeping 'the people duly armed' in 'some organization', since his point would not make sense were there no militia obligation - the people could be individually armed somehow & in full compliance with 2ndA, damn the militias, hah.
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