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Israel/Palestine
In reply to the discussion: NLRB Confirms Legality of Union Support for Israel Boycott; Union Condemns Political Attacks on BDS [View all]Little Tich
(6,171 posts)39. Did you download a copy of Morris's "The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited"?
I'd like to direct your attention to map 2: Arab settlements abandoned in 1948-49 together with the corresponding key indicating the reason for their abandonment:
In the Key, the following codes are used for decisive causes of abandonment:
A Abandonment on Arab orders
C influence of nearby town's fall
E Expulsion by Jewish forces
F Fear (of being caught up in fighting)
M Military assault on settlement
W Whispering campaigns - psychological warfare by Haganah/IDF
The lines between C, F and M are somewhat blurred. It is often difficult to distinguish between the flight of villagers because of reports of the fall or flight from neighbouring settlements, flight from fear of"being next" or flight due to the approach of a HaganahlIDF column. I have generally ascribed the flight of inhabitants on the path of an Israeli military advance to M, even though some villagers may have already taken to their heels upon hearing of the fall of a neighbouring village (which could go under C or F). Similarly the line between M and E is occasionally blurred.
A Abandonment on Arab orders
C influence of nearby town's fall
E Expulsion by Jewish forces
F Fear (of being caught up in fighting)
M Military assault on settlement
W Whispering campaigns - psychological warfare by Haganah/IDF
The lines between C, F and M are somewhat blurred. It is often difficult to distinguish between the flight of villagers because of reports of the fall or flight from neighbouring settlements, flight from fear of"being next" or flight due to the approach of a HaganahlIDF column. I have generally ascribed the flight of inhabitants on the path of an Israeli military advance to M, even though some villagers may have already taken to their heels upon hearing of the fall of a neighbouring village (which could go under C or F). Similarly the line between M and E is occasionally blurred.
(Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited, map 2)
There's a compilation of the Key to Map 2 in the wikipedia article I quoted above, which has the following numbers:
Decisive causes of abandonment of Palestinian villages and towns according to Benny Morris
Decisive causes of abandonment Occurrences
military assault on settlement 215
influence of nearby town's fall 59
expulsion by Jewish forces 53
fear (of being caught up in fighting) 48
whispering campaigns 15
abandonment on Arab orders 6
unknown 44
Decisive causes of abandonment Occurrences
military assault on settlement 215
influence of nearby town's fall 59
expulsion by Jewish forces 53
fear (of being caught up in fighting) 48
whispering campaigns 15
abandonment on Arab orders 6
unknown 44
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_1948_Palestinian_exodus#Morris.27s_Four_Waves_analysis
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the following passage in Morris's book, p60-61 from chapter 2: "The idea of transfer in Zionist thinking before 1948" (Actually, it's better to read the whole chapter, but the passage, will do.):
My feeling is that the transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s was not tantamount to preplanning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan of expulsion; the Yishuv and its military forces did not enter the 1948 War, which was initiated by the Arab side, with a policy or plan for expulsion. But transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism because it sought to transform a land which was Arab into a Jewish state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population; and because this aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs which, in turn, persuaded the Yishuvs leaders that a hostile Arab majority or large minority could not remain in place if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure. By 1948, transfer was in the air. The transfer thinking that preceded the war contributed to the denouement by conditioning the Jewish population, political parties, military organisations and military and civilian leaderships for what transpired. Thinking about the possibilities of transfer in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned hearts and minds for its implementation in the course of 1948 so that, as it occurred, few voiced protest or doubt; it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population. The facts that Palestines Arabs (and the Arab states) had rejected the UN partition resolution and, to nip it in the bud, had launched the hostilities that snowballed into fullscale civil war and that the Arab states had invaded Palestine and attacked Israel in May 1948 only hardened Jewish hearts toward the Palestinian Arabs, who were seen as mortal enemies and, should they be coopted into the Jewish state, a potential Fifth Column.
Thus, the expulsions that periodically dotted the Palestinian Arab exodus raised few eyebrows and thus the Yishuvs leaders, parties and population in mid-war accepted without significant dissent or protest the militarily and politically sensible decision not to allow an Arab refugee return.
It was at this point and in this context that some Yishuv leaders occasionally looked back and reflected upon the connection between what had already happened (by autumn 1948, some 400,000500,000 Arabs had been displaced) and the transfer thinking of the 1930s and 1940s.
In my opinion . . . there is no need to discuss a return of the refugees [so long as a renewal of hostilities is possible] . . . , said Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Israels minister of interior, in September 1948. In the past we had a plan, that were we able to transfer the Arab population to [neighbouring] Arab states we would have been ready to participate in the expense of their resettlement with assistance and financial help. Now, too, I see nothing wrong with this plan . . .
Thus, the expulsions that periodically dotted the Palestinian Arab exodus raised few eyebrows and thus the Yishuvs leaders, parties and population in mid-war accepted without significant dissent or protest the militarily and politically sensible decision not to allow an Arab refugee return.
It was at this point and in this context that some Yishuv leaders occasionally looked back and reflected upon the connection between what had already happened (by autumn 1948, some 400,000500,000 Arabs had been displaced) and the transfer thinking of the 1930s and 1940s.
In my opinion . . . there is no need to discuss a return of the refugees [so long as a renewal of hostilities is possible] . . . , said Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Israels minister of interior, in September 1948. In the past we had a plan, that were we able to transfer the Arab population to [neighbouring] Arab states we would have been ready to participate in the expense of their resettlement with assistance and financial help. Now, too, I see nothing wrong with this plan . . .
(Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited, p60-61)
What I want to prove with this post is that there was indeed a well formulated idea that Arabs ought to be "transferred" and that the resulting removal of Arabs from Palestine seems to reflect that in practice.
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NLRB Confirms Legality of Union Support for Israel Boycott; Union Condemns Political Attacks on BDS [View all]
Little Tich
Jul 2016
OP
I personally don't think that promoting equal rights for Palestinians is anti-Semitic.
Little Tich
Jul 2016
#7
Only about 10% of Palestinians would agree to a secular, liberal western style democracy.
shira
Jul 2016
#15
If the partition plan from 1947 would've been adhered to, the Palestinian refugees would've been
Little Tich
Jul 2016
#24
I suppose that if one starts drinking the hasbara kool-Aid, there's no going back to reality.
Little Tich
Jul 2016
#30
Did you download a copy of Morris's "The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited"?
Little Tich
Jul 2016
#39