Le Monde on the Surveillance by the NSA of French electronic communications.
Here is a compilation of the source documents published by Le Monde on the NSA surveillance in France:
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
Specifically, Le Monde reports that the NSA has focused on surveillance associated with Wanadoo.fr and Alcatel-Lucent. The suspicion is that the NSA taps the cables. According to le Monde (and I think we already know or guessed this), the US has placed its allies as well as its potential enemies under surveillance. One of the methods is to tap the underwater cables. Le Monde suggests that those cables are described by an anonymous individual in the government as "nests of espionage."
Sorry, I can't copy the text from Le Monde. I used to be able to do that, but I am unable to do that now.
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
Here is some of the data regarding the American surveillance in France.
The techniques used for interception appear under the codes "DRTBOX" and "WHITE BOX." Their characteristics are not known. But we know that thanks to the first code, 65.5 million of telephone data bits (not sure of translation) were collected in France from December 10, 2012 to January 8, 2013 and that the second allowed the recording during the same period of 7.8 million units (again, not technologically savvy enough to be sure I am translating that expression correctly). The documents provide sufficient explanations to believe that the targets of the NSA are people suspected of ties with terrorist activities as well as individuals focused on simply because of their associations with the worlds of business, politics or French government.
Les techniques utilisées pour ces interceptions apparaissent sous les codes "DRTBOX" et "WHITEBOX". Leurs caractéristiques ne sont pas connues. Mais on sait que grâce au premier code, 62,5 millions de données téléphoniques sont collectés en France du 10 décembre 2012 au 8 janvier 2013 et que le second permet d'enregistrer sur la même période 7,8 millions d'éléments. Les documents donnent suffisamment d'explications pour penser que les cibles de la NSA concernent aussi bien des personnes suspectées de liens avec des activités terroristes que des individus visés pour leur simple appartenance au monde des affaires, de la politique ou à l'administration française.
The illustrations or diagrams of the NSA show a means for intercepting 3 million communications each day reaching at times nearly 7 million around December 24, 2012 and January 7, 2013. (Not sure of my translation. If someone wants to correct me, please do.) But from the 28th to the 31st of December, there do not appear to have been any interceptions of communications. This apparent hiatus in the activity may be explained by the delay at the end of December 2012 necessitated for the reenactment by the American Congress of Section 702, which is the law covering electronic espionage outside the US. Similarly, it without any apparent reason, nothing appears on the third, fifth and sixth of January 2013. Numerous questions arise beginning with the exact identities of the targets and the grounds for collecting such a massive amount of data on the foreign territory of a sovereign ally.
Le graphique de la NSA montre une moyenne d'interceptions de 3 millions de données par jour avec des pointes à presque 7 millions les 24 décembre 2012 et 7 janvier 2013. Mais du 28 au 31 décembre, aucune interception ne semble avoir été opérée. Cet apparent arrêt d'activité pourrait s'expliquer, notamment, par le délai nécessaire à la reconduction, fin décembre 2012, par le Congrès américain de la section 702 de la loi encadrant l'espionnage électronique à l'étranger. De même, rien n'apparaît les 3, 5 et 6 janvier 2013 sans que l'on puisse, cette fois-ci, avancer de raison plausible. De nombreuses questions se posent encore, à commencer par l'identité précise des cibles et les justifications d'une collecte si massive de données sur un territoire étranger, souverain et allié.
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/comment-la-nsa-espionne-la-france_3499758_651865.html
In short, the French have detailed information about the scope of the surveillance in their country, enough to be sure that the surveillance is not limited to terrorist suspects or people with links to terrorists. It is much vaster than that.
I gather that the French are not surprised by the fact of the surveillance but are offended by the scope of it. They also seem to believe that countries that are English-speaking allies of the US are not subject to the same surveillance rules or techniques as non-English-speaking allies of the US. This, I suspect, would rile the French, especially the current socialist government.
This is not good news for the US. We need an international protocol on the spying. And we need an international body that overseas the enforcement of that protocol. I have a suspicion that it will take a while to get it but that it will inevitably come. Everyone wants to spy, but no one wants to be spied on. And when the spying includes snooping on businesses and their managers and employees, that's pretty bad. Why would the US want to do that? Could be many reasons, and some could be quite troubling.