Why Israel Is Concerned About American-Russian Understandings on Syria
The agreement reached during the G-20 meetings in Hamburg between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin on July 7, 2017, about establishing a de-escalation zone in southwestern Syria was accepted with mixed feelings in Israel.
Jerusalem, of course, welcomes stability in the southern part of Syria. But Prime Minister Netanyahu voiced concern about the agreement mainly because it focused on the de-escalation zone. It tacitly gave legitimacy to the prolonged presence of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces throughout the regions of Syria nominally controlled by the Assad regime.
Israeli doubts about this American policy will probably intensify following Trump’s decision to curtail U.S. assistance to opposition groups that were supported by the CIA. Moreover, Israel is alarmed by recent reports about negotiations between Russia and the United States that practically allow Assad to stay in power and that guarantee a favorable division of the territory between Assad and his supporters and the forces who cooperate with the United States.
Israel has five major concerns regarding the Iranian entrenchment in Syria. Two of them are an immediate concern. Israel regards these specific two as tripwires that if and when crossed, Israel will react. These are:
1. Iran’s ongoing effort together with its proxy Hizbullah to turn the northern part of the Golan Heights into a base from which the Iranians could launch – via their proxies – terror activities against Israel. Throughout the civil war in Syria, Israel countered Iranian efforts to establish a launching pad for terror attacks in the northern Golan Heights with the decisive reaction that foiled these attempts. Last year, it seemed that Iranians got the message, and they have been much more cautious about this idea.
2. Iran’s presence in Syria allows for the acceleration of the delivery of military equipment to Hizbullah through Syria, including the supply of “tie-breaking” weapons and weapons components, such as –
--precision guidance for Iranian-made missiles such as the Fatah 110 and missiles with heavier payloads;
--land-to-sea missiles produced by Iran, China, and Russia (C-704, C-802, Yakhont supersonic anti-ship cruise missile with a 600 km range;
--SA-22 air defense system and a wide variety of anti-aircraft missiles produced in Russia and Iran);
--unmanned air vehicles, drones;
--mini submarines (Ghadir type);
--anti-tank missiles, etc.
So far, Israel has not been shy about hitting those armed shipments on Syrian territory. Recently, Prime Minister Netanyahu even admitted that Israel carried out “dozens and dozens” of such attacks. If Iran managed to solidify its presence in Syria and most of all, establish an Iranian-controlled ground corridor stretching from Iran, through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon (the “Shia Crescent”), it would be able to deliver these arms with greater safety and with fewer limits on the kinds of weapons to be delivered. In the meantime, due to ongoing Israeli interdictions, the Iranians have already embarked on building weapons production factories in Lebanon and maybe in Syria that will facilitate the supply to Hizbullah of advanced weaponry. (To some extent Iran did the same with Hamas in Gaza.)
But beyond these two well-known concerns, the Iranian presence in Syria should worry Israel for three other reasons, which are no less dangerous.
http://jcpa.org/israel-concerned-american-russian-understandings-syria/