Legal decision casts doubt on Maryland’s assault weapons ban

[branford]

A federal appeals court on Thursday cast doubt on the legality of Maryland’s 2013 ban on semiautomatic high-capacity assault weapons that passed after the mass shootings at a Newtown, Conn., elementary school.

The 2-to-1 decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit sends the gun-control law back to a lower court for review, but allows the existing ban to remain in place.

* * *

Specifically, the court’s opinion Thursday directs U.S. District Judge Catherine C. Blake, who sits in Baltimore, to apply a strict standard of legal review when considering the government’s interest in protecting public safety.


https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/appeals-court-decision-casts-doubt-on-marylands-assault-weapons-ban/2016/02/04/8a234240-cb59-11e5-88ff-e2d1b4289c2f_story.html

[beevul]

1. Amazing.

From the article:

“I think it’s just common sense that the Second Amendment does not give people a right to own military-style assault weapons,” he said.

Did this guy get his legal expertise from a crackerjack box? The second amendment doesn't 'give' anyone the right to do anything. It is intended to protect the right, from people in positions of power like him.

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Robert B. King wrote: “Let’s be real: The assault weapons banned by Maryland’s [law] are exceptionally lethal weapons of war” and as such, he said, not necessarily protected by the Second Amendment.

"Exceptionally lethal weapons of war". Right. Which is why no army in the world issues semi-automatic weapons to their troops in any way meaningful enough to support his point.

It sounds very much like a political opinion to me, rather than an opinion based in facts and the law.

[Nuclear Unicorn]

3. I'm confused.

We're constantly lectured that the 2A is about keeping the militia equipped but then we're told military grade weapons in the civilian marketplace are a bad idea.

[Press Virginia]

4. But they aren't any more military grade than a 9mm Barretta

I no longer own an AR but I know the difference between what I owned and the M-16 I used in the Army

[Eleanors38]

6. I saw that, too.

[Press Virginia]

5. We should ban 9mm Barrettas or, as the military calls them, the M9

It's far closer to a military weapon than an AR

[TeddyR]

2. The standard of review

Applied to the law is an important issue, and in some senses dispositive. The Supreme Court in Heller didn't say which standard applied, but I would argue that -- as the 4th Circuit held -- the strict standard of review should apply, just like it does when any state passes a law that impedes a constitutionally protected right.

[beevul]

7. Uh oh. This case destroys a whole lot of anti...

From the actual decision:

Lawful Purposes Plaintiffs Kolbe and Turner both seek to acquire and keep semi-automatic rifles, equipped with LCMs, in their homes primarily for self-defense. And, they proffered evidence suggesting that they are not alone in this regard. For example, Plaintiffs’ expert James Curcuruto presented survey evidence showing that self-defense was a primary reason for the purchase of weapons banned under the FSA, and a 1989 Report from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms indicated that self-defense was a suitable purpose for semi-automatic rifles. The State’s expert Daniel Webster even agreed that it is reasonable to assume that a purpose for keeping one of the prohibited weapons is self-defense in the home.

The State argues that even if ownership of the prohibited weapons and magazines is common, nothing in the record reflects that these weapons are commonly used for self-defense. More specifically, the State’s position is premised on Plaintiffs’ lack of evidence that the banned semi-automatic rifles have ever actually been used in self-defense in Maryland, as opposed to being possessed for self-defense. The State’s position flows from a hyper-technical, out-of-context parsing of the Supreme Court’s statement in Heller “that the sorts of weapons protected were those in common use at the time.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The State misreads Heller, as Second Amendment rights do not depend on how often the semi-automatic rifles or regulated magazines are actually used to repel an intruder.

For perspective, we note that in 2012, the number of AR- and AK-style weapons manufactured and imported into the United States was more than double the number of Ford F-150 trucks sold, the most commonly sold vehicle in the United States.

Likewise, the record in this case shows unequivocally that LCMs are commonly kept by American citizens, as there are more than 75 million such magazines in circulation in the United States. In fact, these magazines are so common that they are standard.

In addition, we reject the State’s argument that the Second Amendment does not apply to detachable magazines because magazines are not firearms—that is, detachable magazines do not constitute “bearable” arms that are expressly protected by the Second Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. II. By Maryland’s logic, the government can circumvent Heller, which established that the State cannot ban handguns kept in the home for self-defense, simply by prohibiting possession of individual components of a handgun, such as the firing pin.

Obviously, magazines and the rounds they contain are used to strike at another and inflict damage. Early American provisions protecting the right to “arms” were also crafted partly in response to British measures that, while not taking away guns entirely, drastically impaired their utility -- suggesting “arms” should be read to protect all those items necessary to use the weapons effectively.

The proper standard under Heller is whether the prohibited weapons and magazines are “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” as a matter of history and tradition, id. at 625 (emphasis added), not whether the magazines are often actually employed in self-defense incidents. Actual use in self-defense is a poor measure of whether a particular firearm is “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens” for self-defense, as it is unlikely most people will ever need to actually discharge a firearm in self-defense. See Fyock, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1276 (“The fact that few people will require a particular firearm to effectively defend themselves should be celebrated and not seen as a reason to except [that firearm] from Second Amendment protection. Evidence that such magazines are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes is enough.”). More importantly, it is the government’s burden to establish that a particular weapon or activity falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment right. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702-03 (“If the government can establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant historical as we can tell, nothing in the record suggests any such tradition with respect to semi-automatic rifles or LCMs. In fact, the Supreme Court, in a pre-Heller decision, hinted at the opposite, stating that “certain categories of guns,” such as “machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces,” have a “quasi-suspect character,” but that “guns falling outside those categories traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions.”


Heller reiterated that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.” We find nothing moment—1791 or 1868—then the analysis can stop there.”). So far in the record demonstrating that law-abiding citizens have been historically prohibited from possessing semi-automatic rifles and LCMs. (“[O]utside of weapons deemed dangerous or unusual, there is no historical tradition supporting wholesale prohibitions of entire classes of weapons.”). In fact, semi-automatic firearms have been in use by the civilian population for more than a century. “Initially called ‘self-loading’ or ‘auto-loading’ firearms,” , semi-automatic weapons with detachable magazines started to see significant advancements in the late 1800s. In 1893, the “Brochardt semi-auto pistol” was developed for the civilian market. J.A. 2255. In 1905, Winchester produced a semi-automatic rifle, equipped with either a five- or ten-round detachable magazine. And, in 1963, Colt produced the SP-1 semi-automatic rifle with a 20-round detachable magazine, later known as the AR-15, a semi-automatic counterpart to the fully automatic M-16. There is no record evidence or historical documentation that these weapons were at all prohibited until relatively recently.

But wait, theres more:

Dangerous and Unusual Weapons

Finally, the State argues that the banned semi-automatic rifles are “unusually dangerous” and therefore do not fall within the ambit of the Second Amendment. Heller makes clear that “dangerous and unusual” weapons are not “weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” that have some degree of Second Amendment protection. But because all firearms are dangerous by definition, the State reasons that Heller must mean firearms that are “unusually dangerous” fall altogether outside of the scope of the Second Amendment. The State views the banned guns and LCMs as “unusually dangerous,” rendering the Second Amendment inapplicable to the ban.

The State’s novel “unusually dangerous” standard reads too much into Heller. As best we can tell, no statute or case has mentioned, much less adopted, the State’s newly proffered standard.

In distinguishing between protected and unprotected weapons, Heller focused on whether the weapons were typically or commonly possessed, not whether they reached or exceeded some undefined level of dangerousness. Hand grenades, sawed-off shotguns and fully automatic “M-16 rifles and the like,” are unusual weapons that fall outside of the Second Amendment because they are not in common use or typically possessed by the citizenry, see id.; Fincher, 538 F.3d at 874 (“Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.”).

Nothing in Heller suggests that courts considering a Second Amendment challenge must decide whether a weapon is “unusually dangerous.” Moreover, the difficulties that would arise fromthe application of such a standard are fairly apparent. How is a court to determine which weapons are too dangerous to implicate the Second Amendment? The district court believed that semi-automatic rifles with LCMs are too dangerous based on evidence that they unleash greater destructive force than other firearms and appear to be disproportionately connected to mass shootings. But if the proper judicial standard is to go by total murders committed, then handguns should be considered far more dangerous than semi-automatic rifles. “Most murders in America are committed with handguns. No other weapon is used nearly as often. During 2006, handguns were used in 60%of all murders while long guns . . . were used only in 7%.” Carl T. Bogus, Gun Control & America’s Cities: Public Policy & Politics, 1 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 440, 447 (2008) (footnote omitted). And, the use of handguns in the number of overall homicides is out of proportion to the ownership of handguns. See id. at 447 (“[A]mong the 192 million guns in America only 35%are handguns. [H]andguns are used in 88%of all firearm murders.”

Yet Heller has established that handguns are constitutionally protected and therefore cannot be too dangerous for Second Amendment purposes. Furthermore, Heller refers to “dangerous” and “unusual” conjunctively, suggesting that even a dangerous weapon may enjoy constitutional protection if it is widely employed for lawful purposes, i.e., not unusual. Founding era understandings of what it means for something to be “unusual” reflect that the firearmmust be rare to be considered “unusual.” See Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 717 (1768) (defining “unusual” as “not common: not frequent: rare”); Bailey, supra, at 641 (defining “unusualness” as “rareness, and uncommonness”); accord Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (suggesting that laws applicable to “dangerous and unusual” weapons were “understood to cover carriage of uncommon, frightening weapons only”).

In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 750 (N.J. App. Div. 2013) (“[T]he protection was not understood to extend to the keeping, carrying or using of weapons that were deemed dangerous or unusual, in the sense that they were not typically used by the law-abiding and responsible for lawful purposes.”). Indeed, it was only a dissent in Heller that focused on dangerousness alone. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 711 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, the State’s “unusually dangerous” argument is of no avail.

B. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny Having determined that the Second Amendment covers the prohibited semi-automatic rifles, we next consider whether the district court erred in applying intermediate scrutiny. We first consider which of the two relevant standards of scrutiny (strict or intermediate scrutiny) should apply.

The strict-scrutiny standard requires the government to prove its restriction is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997); see Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (explaining strict scrutiny “requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be narrowly tailored, the law must employ the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling government interest. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). Conversely, intermediate scrutiny requires the government to “demonstrate . . . that there is a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and a substantial government objective.” Chester, 628 F.3d at 683. For several reasons, we find that the Act’s firearms and magazine bans require strict scrutiny.


In Chester, we adopted a First-Amendment-like approach to determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to any given Second Amendment challenge. To select the proper level of scrutiny, we consider “the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.” 628 F.3d at 682. “A less severe regulation -- a regulation that does not encroach on the core of the Second Amendment -- requires a less demanding means-ends showing.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The right to bear arms, however venerable, is qualified by what one might call the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘why.’”). First, the FSA’s ban on semi-automatic rifles and larger-capacity magazines burdens the availability and use of a class of arms for self-defense in the home, where the protection afforded by the Second Amendment is at its greatest. It implicates the “core” of the Second Amendment: “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634, 635; see Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“What we know from[Heller and McDonald] is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”). At stake here is a “basic right,” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767, “that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted . . . among those fundamental rights necessary to our systemof ordered liberty,” id. at 778. Indeed, “[t]he [Supreme] Court [in Heller] went to great lengths to emphasize the special place that the home—an individual's private property—occupies in our society.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012).

Second, we conclude that the challenged provisions of the FSA substantially burden this fundamental right. The burden imposed in this case is not merely incidental. Maryland law imposes a complete ban on the possession by law-abiding citizens of AR-15 style rifles—the most popular class of centerfire semi-automatic rifles in the United States. As we explained in Section III.A., these weapons are protected under the Second Amendment. We therefore struggle to see how Maryland’s law would not substantially burden the core Second Amendment right to defend oneself and one’s family in the home with a firearmthat is commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for such lawful purposes. Moreover, the FSA also reaches every instance where an AR-15 platformsemi-automatic rifle or LCMmight be preferable to handguns or bolt-action rifles--for example hunting, recreational shooting, or competitive marksmanship events, all of which are lawful purposes protected by the Constitution. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (Mem.) (December 7, 2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting fromthe denial of cert.) (“[T]he ordinance criminalizes modern sporting rifles (e.g., AR-style semiautomatic rifles), which many Americans own for lawful purposes like self-defense, hunting, and target shooting.”). Thus, the FSA completely prohibits, not just regulates, an entire category of weaponry.

As Judge Kavanaugh noted in dissent in Heller II, prohibiting this group of weapons might be “equivalent to a ban on a category of speech.”

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the fact that handguns, bolt-action and other manually-loaded long guns, and, as noted earlier, a few semi-automatic rifles are still available for self-defense does not mitigate this burden.

Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected essentially the same argument in Heller—that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban did not unconstitutionally burden the right to self-defense because the law permitted the possession of long guns for home defense. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e. long guns) is allowed.”); accord Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the District’s argument that alternative weapons rendered handgun ban lawful, calling it “frivolous,” and noting that “it could be similarly contended that all firearms may be banned so long as sabers were permitted”); cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (“[O]ne is not to have the exercise of liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”).

A semi-automatic rifle may not be “the quintessential self-defense weapon,” as Heller described the handgun, 554 U.S. at 629; nonetheless, as we explained previously, AR-15s and the like are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for self-defense and other lawful purposes and are protected under the Second Amendment. There are legitimate reasons for citizens to favor a semi-automatic rifle over handguns in defending themselves and their families at home. The record contains evidence suggesting that “handguns are inherently less accurate than long guns” as they “are more difficult to steady” and “absorb less of the recoil reducing accuracy.” J.A. 2131. This might be an important consideration for a typical homeowner, who “under the extreme duress of an armed and advancing attacker is likely to fire at, but miss, his or her target.” J.A. 2123. “Nervousness and anxiety, lighting conditions, the presence of physical obstacles . . . and the mechanics of retreat are all factors which contribute to [the] likelihood” that the homeowner will shoot at but miss a home invader. J.A. 2123. These factors could also affect an individual’s ability to reload a firearmquickly during a home invasion. Similarly, a citizen’s ability to defend himself and his home is enhanced with an LCM.

In sum, for a law-abiding citizen who, for whatever reason, chooses to protect his home with a semi-automatic rifle instead of a semi-automatic handgun, or possesses an LCMfor use in firearms kept in the home, the FSA significantly burdens the exercise of the right to armoneself at home. “The right to self-defense is largely meaningless if it does not include the right to choose the most effective means of defending oneself.”

(“The ultimate decision for what constitutes the most effective means of defending one’s home, family, and property resides in individual citizens and not the government. . . . The extent of danger—real or imagined—that a citizen faces at home is a matter only that person can assess in full.”) The FSA “restrict[s] the right[] of [Maryland’s] citizens to select the means by which they defend their homes and families.”

As we have noted on previous occasions, “any law that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited.” United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). “[T]his longstanding out-of-the-home/in-the-home distinction bears directly on the level of scrutiny applicable,” id., with strict scrutiny applying to laws restricting the right to self-defense in the home, see Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing that restrictions on “the right to arm oneself at home” necessitates the application of strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny, then, is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the ban of semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than 10 rounds.

We recognize that other courts have reached different outcomes when assessing similar bans, but we ultimately find those decisions unconvincing. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, recently upheld a ban on “assault weapons” and LCMs by dispensing with levels of scrutiny entirely. See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410. Instead, that court conjured its own test, asking “whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit’s approach cannot be reconciled with Heller, which looked to present-day use to assess whether handguns are in common use (and consequently protected). See 554 U.S. at 629; see also id. at 582 (“Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment.” (emphasis added)). Friedman, on the other hand, ignores the Supreme Court’s specification of present-day focus and asks instead whether certain features of the weapons in question were common at the time of the Founding, effectively elevating a Heller dissent to constitutional canon. Compare Friedman, 784 F.3d at 408-09 (suggesting that present day common use cannot be the relevant test because machine guns were in common use when they were federally banned in 1934 and are now uncommon because of the ban), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 720-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).

Friedman’s problems stretch beyond its direct contradiction of Heller. For instance, the Friedman opinion defines the scope of the Second Amendment right by reference to militias -- but it then declares that states, “which are in charge of militias,” should determine what weapons are rightfully held for militia-related purposes. Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410-11. That course effectively permits states to opt-out of the Second Amendment. But see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (“[T]he Second Amendment right is fully applicable to states.”). Friedman also concludes that the “dangerousness” of the regulated weapons should not be decisive, Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409, but nevertheless dismisses the self-defense-related benefits of those same weapons because they “can fire more shots, faster, and thus can be more dangerous in aggregate,” id. at 411.

And it recognizes that the restriction must be supported by some genuine state interest, but then finds such an interest in the fact that bans might “reduce[] the perceived risk from a mass shooting.” Id. at 412 (emphasis added). In other words, under the Seventh Circuit’s view, a significant restriction on a fundamental right might be justified by benefits that are quite literally imagined into existence. Needless to say, we see much to question in the Seventh Circuit’s decision.

Whatever may be said about the bans at issue in Fyock and Heller II, it should be obvious by this point that we view Maryland’s ban quite differently. A wholesale ban on an entire class of common firearms is much closer to the total handgun ban at issue in Heller than more incidental restrictions that might be properly subject to intermediate scrutiny. The law here “goes beyond mere regulation” and is instead “a total prohibition of possession of certain types of arms.”

In this way, Maryland’s outright ban on LCMs and “assault weapons” is akin to a law that “foreclose[s] an entire mediumof expression.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). Such laws receive exceptionally rigorous review in the analogous context of the First Amendment, id., and we see no reason for a different method here.

Because the district court did not evaluate the challenged provisions of the FSA under the proper standard of strict scrutiny, and the State did not develop the evidence or arguments required to support the FSA under the proper standard, we vacate the district court’s order as to Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment challenge and remand for the court to apply strict scrutiny in the first instance.

Our distinguished dissenting colleague asserts that we have imprudently and unnecessarily broken with our sister courts of appeal and infers that we will bear some responsibility for future mass shootings. In our view, inferences of this nature have no place in judicial opinions and we will not respond beyond noting this. The meaning of the Constitution does not depend on a popular vote of the circuits and it is neither improper nor imprudent for us to disagree with the other circuits addressing this issue. We are not a rubber stamp. We require strict scrutiny here not because it aligns with our personal policy preferences but because we believe it is compelled by the law set out in Heller and Chester.

To sumup, the panel vacates the district court’s summary judgment order on Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims and remands for the district court to apply strict scrutiny.

I'm pretty sure I got a few of those paragraphs out of order, but the message is the same. I strongly suggest everyone read the entire decision, especially the anti-gun folks.

https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/297998206?access_key=key-cy83F0QHe2dsNdtkutMm&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll

I suspect this will eclipse the PLCAA and become the new 'most hated'.

[Nuclear Unicorn]

8. Isn't it intriguing that the state contradicted itself by arguing both that

AR-15s were unusually dangerous but also seldom used.

[beevul]

10. Indeed.

(previous post deleted because it was irreparably wonky)


I'm pretty sure this means that strict scrutiny MUST be applied, which if true, means the end of pretty much all nuisance type gun laws, like the Maryland law.

I liked these parts too:

Our distinguished dissenting colleague asserts that we have imprudently and unnecessarily broken with our sister courts of appeal and infers that we will bear some responsibility for future mass shootings. In our view, inferences of this nature have no place in judicial opinions and we will not respond beyond noting this. The meaning of the Constitution does not depend on a popular vote of the circuits and it is neither improper nor imprudent for us to disagree with the other circuits addressing this issue. We are not a rubber stamp. We require strict scrutiny here not because it aligns with our personal policy preferences but because we believe it is compelled by the law set out in Heller and Chester.

In addition, we reject the State’s argument that the Second Amendment does not apply to detachable magazines because magazines are not firearms—that is, detachable magazines do not constitute “bearable” arms that are expressly protected by the Second Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. II. By Maryland’s logic, the government can circumvent Heller, which established that the State cannot ban handguns kept in the home for self-defense, simply by prohibiting possession of individual components of a handgun, such as the firing pin.

For perspective, we note that in 2012, the number of AR- and AK-style weapons manufactured and imported into the United States was more than double the number of Ford F-150 trucks sold, the most commonly sold vehicle in the United States.

[beevul]

11. Link to the GD "non gun" thread about this.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/10027586098

[jmg257]

12. While NY US Court of Appeals used "intermediate scrutiny" to uphold NY & CTs ban.

CONCLUSION
2 To summarize, we hold as follows:
3 (1) The core prohibitions by New York and Connecticut of
4 assault weapons and large‐capacity magazines do not
5 violate the Second Amendment.  
6 (a) We assume that the majority of the prohibited
7 conduct falls within the scope of Second
8 Amendment protections. The statutes are
9 appropriately evaluated under the constitutional
10 standard of “intermediate scrutiny”—that is,
11 whether they are “substantially related to the
12 achievement of an important governmental
13 interest.”
14 (b) Because the prohibitions are substantially related
15 to the important governmental interests of public
16 safety and crime reduction, they pass
17 constitutional muster



Now what?

[beevul]

13. The old saying...

The old saying "The law is an ass" definitely applies there.

Hopefully, this goes all the way to the supreme court, and ALL courts will have to apply strict scrutiny where the second amendment is concerned, just as with the first amendment.

Intermediate scrutiny seems like a fancy way to say "because someone said so", with very little burden of proof required.

Besides that, and not that I subscribe to the 'militia' interpretation, but the banned rifles are far more suited to a militia than the handguns that were at issue in Heller. Those against ownership of the rifles in question seem content to try to have it both ways.

[TeddyR]

15. Strict scrutiny certainly should apply

Unless folks on DU are ok with intermediate scrutiny applying to all constitutionally protected rights.

[Lurks Often]

14. And all you hear is crickets from the gun control extremists

Both on this thread and the one in GD that had even fewer responses: http://www.democraticunderground.com/10027586098