Gorbachev: Is the World Really Safer Without the Soviet Union?

[ellisonz]

Mikhail Gorbachev
December 21, 2011 | This article appeared in the January 9-16, 2012 edition of The Nation.

Virtually all American commentary about the end of the Soviet Union extols what the West is believed to have gained from that historic event. On this twentieth anniversary of the breakup, The Nation presents three writers who focus instead on what may have been lost. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's last leader and first constitutional president, argues that a chance for a more secure and just world order was missed. Stephen F. Cohen, a historian and longtime Nation contributor, reminds readers of the political, economic and social costs to Russians themselves. And Vadim Nikitin, a US-educated Russian journalist, presents a new interpretation of pro-Soviet nostalgia. —The Editors

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union twenty years ago, Western commentators have often celebrated it as though what disappeared from the world arena in December 1991 was the old Soviet Union, the USSR of Stalin and Brezhnev, rather than the reforming Soviet Union of perestroika. Moreover, discussion of its consequences has focused mostly on developments inside Russia. Equally important, however, have been the consequences for international relations, in particular lost alternatives for a truly new world order opened up by the end of the cold war.

Following my election as general secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, the Soviet leadership formulated a new foreign policy agenda. One of the key ideas of our reforms, or perestroika, was new political thinking, based on the recognition of the world’s interconnectedness and interdependence. The top priority was to avert the threat of nuclear war. Our immediate international goals included ending the nuclear arms race, reducing conventional armed forces, settling numerous regional conflicts involving the Soviet Union and the United States, and replacing the division of the European continent into hostile camps with what I called a common European home.

We understood that this could be accomplished only by working with the United States. Our two nations together held 95 percent of the world’s arsenals of nuclear weapons. It was therefore of enormous importance that at my first summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan, held in Geneva in November 1985, we stated that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” We also agreed that the USSR and the United States would not seek military superiority over each other. At our next summit, in Reykjavik in 1986, Reagan and I went on to discuss specific ways to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

http://www.thenation.com/article/165317/world-really-safer-without-soviet-union

Is Gorbachev correct? Did we make a mistake in not working more with the Soviets? Should detente have gone further? What role do the Soviets have in failing to prepare for a collapse?

[RZM]

1. Here's my reply from another thread on this last week

http://www.democraticunderground.com/?com=view_post&forum=1016&pid=2586

Gorby has long been known to be quite selective with the facts when it comes to his own legacy. This is just another exhibit in that story.

[zipplewrath]

2. The primary problem was Russia itself

The break up of the Union was an internal action. Much of the west didn't particularly choose or want such a thing. Other than weakening Russia, it was seen as a destabilizing situation that threatened Western Europe. The US found itself having a hard time dealing with Russia because it wasn't always clear who was "in charge".

Russia will continue to be a player on the world stage, but China will be far more dominant than Russia. "eastern" Europe will become more european, than Russian over time. Ultimately, Russia is going to have to decide whether they can accept this role. Otherwise, there's more wars coming.

[yellowcanine]

3. Gorbachev admits that. His criticism of the West is for what happened afterword where instead of

using the opportunity to renegotiate the power arrangements the U.S. and NATO behaved more like winners and protected their own interests at the expense of the rest of the world. He has a point.

[zipplewrath]

4. Barely

His point is that they weren't perfect. Okay, but there weren't alot of credible actors with which to negotiate for a significant period of time. To some extent, just to pick and choose who to negotiate with was an act of interference in the internal politics of several states. The situation was so unstable, it wasn't clear, without hindsight, what should be done. It's not unsimilar to the current "arab spring" situation in which the APPARENT goals seem supportable enough, but it isn't always clear that the individual actors are support worthy.

Diplomacy takes trust, and there wasn't alot of trust rolling around at that time.

[yellowcanine]

5. I agree that Gorbachov has his blind spots. But he was in many ways a transformational figure who

through no fault of his own unleashed a series of events which spun out of control, leading Yeltsin and others to take control and do things their way, which was not necessarily to the benefit of many people in the former Soviet Union. I am not so sure that a more gradual breakup of the Soviet Union led by Gorbachov would not have been preferable to a Yeltsin led Russian Federation leading the way into the future. Yeltsin personally was not so corrupt as he was undisciplined and incompetent. For the most part the people in power grabbed the spoils of the broken up Soviet Union and laid the groundwork for massive corruption and kleptocracy.

[zipplewrath]

6. He was warned

If Anatoly Dobrynin is to be believed, Gorbachov was warned that he was unleashing forces he wouldn't be able to control. I'm not sure the Union could have been preserved at all (heck, look, Scotland may want to leave the UK). Probably the best case scenario has it coming apart a little more orderly, but I'm not sure how that really plays out. The union was false, created by force, and maintained not through union but through domination by some actors over others.

[yellowcanine]

7. The union was false, created by force, and maintained not through union but through domination

True but I was a bit surprised when I was in Kazakhstan in 2003 at how many people were still pining for the old Soviet Union. People tend to have selective memories of course and I doubt that anywhere near a majority of Kazakhs would opt for the USSR if they had the choice but maybe a third of them would. Of course the country is about 40% ethnic Russian. I am not sure any union which was so dependent on coercion could come apart in an orderly fashion. One only has to look at Yugoslavia. It may look orderly for a while and then all hell breaks loose. OTOH Czechoslovakia seems to have successfully made a peaceful transition into two sovereign states.

[zipplewrath]

8. Heard the same about eastern Germany

A few years after the reunification, there was a bit of nostalgia for "the old days". Mostly among the young that probably didn't really know the old days to begin with. Heck, I met an old woman in France that pined for the good old days of the monarchy.

Strangely, I think several of the states may have been better off in the long run maintaining the union. I understand the cultural conflicts, and the dominance of ethnic Russians in government. But over all I suspect it may have been a better idea to maitain the union, regardless of how it got formed.

[yellowcanine]

9. Some doing most of the pining were university professors who had it good under the Soviet

Union. Good salary, prestige, lots of perks. Much of that is gone. Sadly there were also lots of babushkas begging on the streets who had somewhat decent pensions under the Soviet system but which are almost worthless in the new system.