Repeating a post I just added to a brilliant thread in LBN, for anyone who doesn't feel Monroe Doctrinish:

[Judi Lynn]

It's surprising that 19th century-influenced posters never bothered to check around much for information:

Thu Aug 1, 2024, 01:49 PM

Why bother to read or look for information when you can simply buy what the totally anal, aggressive right-wing has used to drive US foreign policy all these looooooong years.

Easy grab from Wikipedia, for anyone who doesn't mind reading, for a change:

United States involvement in regime change in Latin America


In what The New York Times described as "Washington’s most overt attempts in decades to carry out regime change in Latin America", the administration of President Donald Trump made an attempt of regime change in an effort to remove President Nicolás Maduro from office during the Venezuelan presidential crisis.[62][63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70][71][72][73] The Congressional Research Service of the United States Congress wrote: "Although the Trump Administration initially discussed the possibility of using military force in Venezuela, it ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure."[74] According to Marc Becker, a Latin American history professor of Truman State University, the claim of the presidency by Juan Guaidó "was part of a U.S.-backed maximum-pressure campaign for regime change that empowered an extremist faction of the country's opposition while simultaneously destroying the economy with sanctions."[64] Economist Agathe Demarais made similar statements in her book Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests, saying that the United States held the belief that regime change was attainable and that sanctions were implemented against Venezuela to hasten the establishment of Guaidó.[65] Jacobin wrote that the corporate-friendly Guaidó movement was meant to take power after a coup supported by the United States removed President Maduro from office.[75] Ahumada Beltrán said that the Trump administration participated in an "open campaign" to overthrow Maduro with a goal to establish American control over oil and to re-establish Venezuela's traditional elite class.[68]

US officials met with members of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela from 2017 to 2018 to discuss coup plans, though discussions ceased after information leaked and some of the plotters were arrested prior to their anticipated actions during the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election.[76] May 2018 presidential elections in Venezuela were boycotted by the opposition and Maduro won amid low turnout; the United States and other nations refused to recognize the elections, saying they were fraudulent.[77] National Security Advisor John Bolton said in a 1 November 2018 speech prior to the 2018 United States elections that the Trump administration would confront a "Troika of tyranny" and remove leftist governments in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela;[78][66] Trump officials spoke to the media about an existing plan to overthrow Maduro, limiting oil exports to Cuba to create economic distress which would prompt its government's removal and then to finally target Nicaragua.[66][79]

In January 2019, Leopoldo López's Popular Will party attained the leadership of the National Assembly of Venezuela according to a rotation agreement made by opposition parties, naming Juan Guaidó as president of the legislative body.[80] Days after Guaidó was sworn in, he and López reached out to the United States Department of State and presented the idea that Guaidó would be named interim president and that the United States could lead other nations to support Guaidó in an effort to remove Maduro; former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo approved of the idea.[81] Though the National Assembly sought to assume executive power from Maduro itself, López and Guaidó continued to work with the State Department without the knowledge of other opposition groups since they believed their objectives would be blocked.[81] State Department official Keith Mines wrote on 20 January that Guaidó declaring himself president "could have the impact of causing the regime to crumble in the face of widespread and overwhelming public support" and on 22 January, Vice President Mike Pence called Guaidó personally and told him that the United States would support his declaration.[81] Neuman wrote that "it's likely that more people in Washington than in Venezuela knew what was going to happen."[81] Guaidó, declared himself the acting President of the country, disputing Maduro's presidency and sparking a presidential crisis. Minutes after the declaration, the United States announced that it recognized Guaidó as president of Venezuela while presidents Iván Duque of Colombia and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, beside Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, made an abrupt announcement at the World Economic Forum that they too recognized Guaidó.[81][82]

Becker said that the United States attempted to remove the Maduro government threatening military action and inflicting desperation on ordinary Venezuelans, planning that distraught citizens or members of the military would remove Maduro in a coup.[64] The United States then increase sanctions on Venezuela[68] and economic conditions drastically deteriorated due to the sanctions.[83] NPR, following a February 2019 statement by President Trump suggesting that members of the Venezuelan armed forces join Guaidó, described such comments as "the latest push for regime change in Venezuela."[84] US Vice President Mike Pence stated in April 2019 that the US was set on Maduro's removal, whether through diplomatic or other means, and that "all options" were on the table.[85] Financial Times wrote following the failed 2019 Venezuelan uprising attempt on 30 April 2019 that regime change in Venezuela was one of Trump's main foreign policy goals and that it was not going as planned.[86] The New York Times wrote following April's failed attempt to remove Maduro that President Trump's aides promoted regime change through social media, with Bolton tweeting hundreds of times about the effort to remove Maduro and going on news networks daily to discuss the situation.[87] Secretary of State Pompeo said that the US would take military action "if required" at the time.[88] In August 2019, President Donald Trump's administration imposed additional sanctions on Venezuela as part of their efforts to remove Maduro from office, ordering a freeze on all Venezuelan government assets in the United States and barring transactions with US citizens and companies.[89][90] In March 2020, the Trump administration deployed naval units in the Caribbean to pressure the Maduro government and later offered a $15 million reward for the capture of Maduro.[68]

More:
United_States_involvement_in_regime_change_in_Latin_America

[Judi Lynn]

1. Before Venezuela, US had long involvement in Latin America

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published 10:31 AM CDT, January 25, 2019

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro accuses the United States of trying to orchestrate a coup against him, and that allegation has resonance among many in a region where Washington has a long history of interventions — military and otherwise.

Ever since President James Monroe announced a sort of protectorate over the hemisphere in the early 19th century known as the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has involved itself in the daily affairs of nations across Latin America, often on behalf of North American commercial interests or to support right-leaning forces against leftist leaders.

That military involvement petered out after the end of the Cold War, although the U.S. has been accused of granting at least tacit backing to coups in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009.

The Trump’s administration leading role in recognizing Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela returns the U.S. to a more assertive role in Latin America than it has had for years.

. . .Some of the most notable U.S. interventions in Latin America:

1846: The United States invades Mexico and captures Mexico City in 1847. A peace treaty the following year gives the U.S. more than half of Mexico’s territory — what is now most of the western United States.

More:
https://apnews.com/article/2ded14659982426c9b2552827734be83

[Judi Lynn]

2. A Tale of Two Attitudes Toward Leftist Governments in Latin America

Shauna N. Gillooly and Sofia-Alexa Porres

Oct 12 2023

In 2023 alone, President Biden has met with four Latin American countries led by left-wing governments, including Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia, and Colombia. Considering the historic tendency of the US to support the right in Latin America, what could these meetings signal towards the future of Latin American-US relations? Relationships between the United States and its southern neighbors have been historically marked by U.S. interventionism in the region, particularly during the Cold War. The Cold War (1947-91) was a moment in history that was marked by simultaneous increase in panic over left-wing ideologies like communism and socialism along with new trends toward globalization in the United States. Truman argued that it was no longer safe to simply depend on the security of US territory for national safety, but rather it now depended on stopping the expansion of Soviet totalitarianism and defending those states that could be corrupted. This vision of interventionism led to the Truman Doctrine. As a result, U.S. interference in Latin American countries increased, with the primary aim of combatting the possible involvement with the Soviet Union in the region as well as the spread of leftist ideologies in respective Latin American governments. This US perspective toward Latin America is one that has been slow to change.

During the ‘banana republic’ era, this intervention took on a more capitalistic approach. US interventions sought to replace democratically elected left-wing governments with those that were more sympathetic to U.S. interests, particularly U.S. business interests abroad. In Guatemala, for example, the U.S. government backed a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz. In 1951, Guatemala held their first democratic presidential election in which Colonel Jacobo Arbenz was elected. However, some of Arbenz’s policies directly threatened U.S. business interests and profit in the country. The Arbenz Administration had introduced Decree 900, which outlined a progressive stance on wages and land reform, which threatened the profit structure of the United Fruit Company, a privately-owned, U.S.-based company. The U.S., seeing this as a threat, involved the CIA in a covert operation during which they armed, trained, and funded the Guatemalan military. The military then overthrew the Arbenz administration. Following the coup, Guatemala remained under a military dictatorship for multiple decades, during which time resulted in the genocide of Indigenous Mayan people in Guatemala in the 1980s. The search for the disappeared is still ongoing in Guatemala today.

Following U.S. intervention in Guatemala, the National Security Council wrote a report in which they outlined the objectives and focus of U.S. policy toward Latin America. In particular, they outline the important role that Latin American had in the Communist expansion era. It reads: “A defection by any significant number of Latin American countries over their governments, would seriously impair the ability of the United States to exercise effective leadership of the Free World […] and constitute a blow to U.S. prestige.” The National Security Council explicitly outlined the need for respect, partnership, and cordiality with other countries in the Americas. However, the report includes a clause which states that they shall recognize Latin American governments “unless a substantial question should arise with respect to Communist control.” This report and subjective quote created leeway and a policy justification for the U.S. to continue to implement policies of interventionism in their ‘own backyard.’

From here on, the U.S. continued to intervene in various Latin American countries and contexts. In Colombia, the U.S. assisted the Colombian government with the threat that leftist guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) posed through Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota. In Argentina, they turned a blind eye to the “Dirty War” that happened in the late 1970’s through the early 1980’s. In Bolivia, various U.S. administrations participated in covert operations throughout the 1960’s. In Chile, they used covert actions to fund electoral candidates, “run anti-Allende propaganda campaigns and had discussed the merits of supporting a military coup,” in the 1960’s and 70’s. We can look to Cuba, where the U.S. participated in both covert and overt operations in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Last but not least in El Salvador, the U.S. funded and trained paramilitary groups that caused unrest and violence in the 1960’s. Most countries in the region had their trajectories of governance altered by U.S. intervention, which continues to have implications for today’s foreign policy discourses and decisions.

With this troubled context of U.S. interventionism in mind, we asked U.S. policymakers how they felt about the progressive wave of administrations recently elected in Latin America. Based on our results, it seems that bureaucrats and technocrats within the U.S. government are no longer particularly concerned over a perceived “leftist threat” in the region. However, that change in attitude is not necessarily shared by many officials in Congress.

More:
https://www.e-ir.info/2023/10/12/a-tale-of-two-attitudes-toward-leftist-governments-in-latin-america/

[Judi Lynn]

3. For anyone who has steadily refused to ever have even the most meager clue, a starting place:

Thu Aug 1, 2024, 02:36 PM

Since at least the Spanish-American War, the United States has helped develop Latin American militaries and police forces, providing training, up-to-date technologies, and technical assistance. While we might conventionally consider questions about security and questions of political economy as separate spheres of analysis, a close look at how economic shifts affect security concerns, and how security assistance shapes political and economic transformations, indicates the persistence of a strong relationship between security objectives and political economy. Outlining these links reveals trends of change within continuity. Even as Washington’s effort to endow Latin American states with powerful security apparatuses has reconfigured the possibilities for US capital to reap easy rewards from its alliances with elites in Latin American and the Caribbean, the purposes and forms of US security assistance have both shifted and remained, in important ways, unchanged.

In fact, an examination of the historical record demonstrates that the security assistance of each period helped to create the security challenges of the next one, which new rounds of assistance would in turn confront. In the current period, reverberations are being felt throughout the hemisphere—including here in the United States—because of the “War on Drugs,” fought from the Andean highlands to the US-Mexico border and beyond. But what I call, drawing on Greg Grandin, the “long counterrevolution” started in the nineteenth century, as the United States increasingly exerted its influence throughout the Americas.1

Gunboat diplomacy and occupation as security cooperation
As the Spanish Empire collapsed at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States saw an opportunity for regional self-aggrandizement at a key moment of global uncertainty. The Spanish Empire’s decline had already been occurring for over a century when the United States occupied Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, but recent economic crises provided new opportunities.2 Thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, the independent republics across Latin America maintained strong, if not always willing, ties to the United States. Economic upheavals in the region from the 1870s through the 1890s created a new purpose for the United States, which was to bend local economies to the desires of US elites. Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine further entrenched this orientation, by commanding the United States to exercise “international police power” to maintain political and economic stability.

Direct invasion or overt occupation was the occasional form of US intervention in Latin America (17 in the century after 1898), and the construction of security forces afterward, with or without occupation, ensured Roosevelt’s corollary would remain in effect.3 These early US occupations saw the creation of new security forces—for example, the US Marines’ assistance to Nicaragua’s Guardia Nacional—designed to foster the most basic forms of economic development while also repressing revolutionary movements that might rebel against the prevailing socioeconomic order.

More:
https://items.ssrc.org/from-our-fellows/the-long-counterrevolution-united-states-latin-america-security-cooperation/

[Judi Lynn]

4. The United States' Hand in Undermining Democracy in Venezuela

It used to be generally frowned upon to openly call for military coups and U.S. intervention in Latin America. Not anymore. At least not when it comes to Venezuela, a country where—according to the prevailing narrative—a brutal dictator is starving the population and quashing all opposition.

Last August, President Trump casually mentioned a “military option” for Venezuela from his golf course in New Jersey, provoking an uproar in Latin America but barely a peep in Washington. Similarly, Rex Tillerson, then-Secretary of State, spoke favorably about a possible military ouster of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro.

In recent months, opinion pieces suggesting that a coup or a foreign military intervention in Venezuela might be a good thing have dotted the U.S. media landscape: from the Washington Post to Project Syndicate to The New York Times. Occasionally a pundit argues that a coup d’état could have undesirable consequences, for instance if a hypothetical coup regime should decide to deepen relations with Russia or China.

Rarely does anyone point out that this is an insane debate to be having in the first place, particularly regarding a country where elections occur frequently and are, with few exceptions, considered to be competitive and transparent. On Sunday, May 20th, Maduro will be up for reelection. Polls suggest that, if turnout is high, he could be voted out of office.

The fact that coups, not elections, are the hot topic is a sad reflection of the warped direction that the mainstream discussion on Venezuela has taken. For many years now, much of the analysis and reporting on the oil-rich but economically-floundering nation have offered a black-and-white, sensationalized depiction of a complex and nuanced internal situation. In addition, there has been little serious discussion of the Trump administration’s policies toward Venezuela even as they wreak further damage to the country’s economy, worsen shortages of life-saving medicines and food, and undermine peace and democracy.

More:
https://nacla.org/news/2018/05/18/united-states%E2%80%99-hand-undermining-democracy-venezuela

[GreenWave]

5. Thank you for these articles.

[Judi Lynn]

7. Hi, Green Wave! It's overwhelming seeing how many MAGA foreign policy advocates come lurching out!

They get just as fired up as the most pompous, truculent apprentice bully MAGAS have to offer!

I tried to deal with these peeps for decades before I realized spending entire days digging up information to add to inform them never seemed to get read, unless someone could point to a source one of them could screech was a secret commie site, etc., then claim he had shot me down! It never changed, they love to pretend they are actually making points.

All anyone has to do is wake up, start doing his homework, retrace his steps back from his dead-end trip to propaganda-land and start paying attention, for once!

Don't give up, the truth WILL win, in the end, and the predator class is going to lose. I wish it would be quicker, don't you?

[Judi Lynn]

6. From 2021, F.A.I.R.: Western Media: Venezuelan Elections Must Be Undemocratic, Because Chavismo Won

DECEMBER 3, 2021

RICARDO VAZ

Corporate media’s coverage of Venezuela has been constantly biased over the past 20 years, but especially when reporting on elections (FAIR.org, 11/27/08, 5/23/18, 1/27/21).


Corporate media’s coverage of Venezuela has been constantly biased over the past 20 years, but especially when reporting on elections (FAIR.org, 11/27/08, 5/23/18, 1/27/21).

The latest flurry of dishonesty and faithful stenography came as Venezuelans voted for new regional and local authorities on November 21. The ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) won resoundingly, securing 19 of 23 governorships and 212 of 335 mayoralties. Pundits who are happy to equate “democracy” with elections are not so keen on people voting when Washington’s enemies are poised to win (Washington Post, 11/22/21).

The hardline Venezuelan opposition made life easy for the media establishment in recent years by boycotting elections altogether. Outlets could then just echo the ever baseless “fraud” allegations from US officials and move on (NPR, 5/21/18; BBC, 5/21/18; Reuters, 5/20/18; Bloomberg, 5/7/18; New York Times, 5/17/18).

However, this time around, these right-wing actors returned to the ballot. Corporate journalists, having paid little attention to Venezuela in recent months as US-backed regime change efforts floundered, had to scramble to explain and discredit the events. Unable to reheat the “fraudulent” label, there was a return of classics such as “rigged” (CNN, 11/24/21) or “flawed” (New York Times, 11/23/21), which happened to be the State Department’s choice too.

‘Flawed’ reporting
There was already a sense that the US-favored parties would not do so well on their return to the electoral path. Reports talked of a “skeptical” opposition (Al Jazeera, 11/19/21; AFP, 11/19/21) to dampen expectations, after building the myth that anti-government parties had overwhelming support in the country.

More:
https://fair.org/home/western-media-venezuelan-elections-must-be-undemocratic-because-chavismo-won/

[Judi Lynn]

8. During the Bush pothole, confused haters beat a path to DU to drain their rage pockets before exploding

Venezuela Land Reform Looks to Seize Idle Farmland

By Juan Forero
Jan. 30, 2005

EL CHARCOTE, Venezuela - There may be no more explosive issue in Latin American politics than land reform, or how to address the problem of too much land in the hands of so few people.

. . .

So far, disputes over the distribution of public land have been relatively rare, with farmers making complaints in about 5 percent of the cases that land they held title to was taken away. But violence is not unheard of, and about 80 peasant land invaders have been killed by landowners, most of them during Mr. Chávez's six years in office.

. . .

Mr. Chávez and peasant farmers across Venezuela say such steps are needed because a small minority of landowners control a vast majority of arable lands, leaving most of the peasantry landless and impoverished and Venezuela importing most of its food.

"Any self-respecting revolution cannot permit such a situation," Mr. Chávez said earlier this month as he signed a decree forming a national commission that will evaluate farms' productivity and the legitimacy of their ownership.

Mr. Chávez's government says its priority is not to expropriate, but rather to tax farms into productivity, by levying stiff penalties against land that is not being put to use. The plan gives farmers with idle fields two years to make them productive.

"We are trying to make a country where agriculture was abandoned into one where it is revived," said Marisol Plaza, Venezuela's solicitor general.

The only lands to be seized, the government says, are those that were illegally obtained. Other, unproductive lands will be expropriated with compensation.

https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/world/americas/venezuela-land-reform-looks-to-seize-idle-farmland.html

More:
www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/world/americas/venezuela-land-reform-looks-to-seize-idle-farmland.html

or:
https://web.archive.org/web/20240725030211/https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/world/americas/venezuela-land-reform-looks-to-seize-idle-farmland.html

~ ~ ~

From the Guardian, during Chavez:


This article is more than 19 years old
Venezuela moves to seize thousands of hectares of 'idle' land from British peer

Associated Press in Caracas
Mon 14 Mar 2005 05.34 EST

The Venezuelan government is to press ahead with plans to expropriate land from a British-owned farm this week, sparking fears of large-scale land grab under the leftist government.

The national lands institute ruled at the weekend that the landowner - Agroflora, an affiliate of the Vestey Group, owned by the tycoon Lord Vestey - did not have a legitimate claim to the land.

. . .

The takeover is part of moves to hand 96,440 hectares (238,620 acres) of Venezuelan land to the poor.

The state will take a large part of Lord Vestey's 13,600-hectare El Charcote cattle ranch in Cojedes state east of Caracas, and most of the 80,000-hectare Pinero Ranch animal reserve, the land agency said. It will also take large chunks of two other ranches. None of the owners could be reached for comment.

National land institute director Eliezer Otaiza told Reuters it would take the land to develop state-sponsored agriculture projects. "The land is going to pass over to us now," he said. "Tomorrow starts the rescue process."

Mr Otaiza said the farms had failed to prove ownership, but had 60 days to appeal to the courts.

The decision follows weeks of land inspections as part of President Hugo Chávez's 2001 land reform law, which allows the state to expropriate farmland if it is "idle", or if rightful ownership is not proved as far back as 1830.

More:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/14/venezuela











Samuel Vestey, 3rd Baron Vestey, one of England's wealthiest peeps and personal friend of Queen Elizabeth

Also owner of many latifundios (huge estates) in Venezuela